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54 
THE MANAGERIAL TURN IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
CARY COGLIANESE* 
Over the last four decades, many aspects of environmental 
quality have improved in the United States.  Nevertheless, existing 
environmental laws and regulations have often proven exceedingly 
costly, and some of the most vexing and significant environmental 
problems, such as climate change and nonpoint water pollution, 
still remain largely unaddressed.  These twin challenges—
excessive costs and untapped benefits—have prompted rightful 
and repeated calls for new approaches to environmental protection.  
One new approach self-consciously seeks to affect the way that 
businesses manage their environmental affairs.  In the past, 
environmental law effectively treated firms themselves as “black 
boxes,” imposing risk-based or technology-based emissions limits 
that simply directed regulated firms to control the pollution they 
emit.  The ways firms managed their operations largely remained 
irrelevant to regulators as long as firms met their legal obligations.  
That old view is changing and the black box is beginning to open.  
Regulators and policy analysts increasingly recognize that firms’ 
internal management is an important ingredient in combating the 
nation’s environmental problems.1 
 
 *  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and the Edward B. Shils Professor of 
Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
The author thanks Susan Rose Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
 1 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 151 (2001) (noting how the importance of 
environmental management systems and other “reflexive” strategies is likely to 
grow “[a]s the pressure of heightening environmental standards and complexities 
increases and the limitations of command regulation [becomes] more apparent”); 
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR 
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 6 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer 
Nash eds., 2006) (“Policymakers and business leaders increasingly recognize that 
what goes on inside the black box of the organization is of critical importance for 
overall environmental quality.”); KENNETH GEISER, MATERIALS MATTER: 
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE MATERIALS POLICY 381–82 (2001) (arguing for “new 
management approaches that encourage and rely on continuous learning and 
organizational change” because attaining a “sustainable economy [requires that] 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367219
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This “managerial turn” represents a notable, and potentially 
laudable, shift in regulatory focus relevant to future environmental 
policy reform.  Governmental strategies to shape firms’ internal 
management may well achieve environmental goals at lower costs.  
Such management-based strategies tend not to impose one-size-
fits-all standards, but instead give firms responsibility for 
developing their own responses to environmental problems, 
thereby leveraging firms’ superior knowledge about the risks they 
generate and the potential methods of reducing those risks.  Given 
their promise, management-based environmental policies deserve 
greater attention.  In this article, I examine several recent 
management-based strategies, consider the empirical evidence on 
their effectiveness in improving environmental performance, and 
assess their overall advantages and disadvantages.  The evidence 
shows that, at least in some cases, management-based policy 
strategies can lead to improvements in industry’s environmental 
performance by getting firms to sink additional costs into assessing 
and better managing their environmental aspects.  As such, 
Congress and regulatory agencies should consider the role of 
management-based strategies in environmental policy’s future. 
I. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES 
The managerial turn is reflected in the actions of both 
governmental officials and business leaders who focus on directly 
shaping private sector environmental management.  Their interest 
in management-based strategies grows generally from a trend 
toward environmental management systems (EMSs) that started in 
the 1990s.2  An EMS consists of a series of internal planning 
processes and operational procedures implemented by a firm both 
to ensure compliance with regulatory standards as well as to try to 
improve the firm’s environmental performance.3  Although the 
specific shape and structure of an EMS can vary across different 
firms, all management systems involve some kind of 
 
corporations and other institutions will need to redesign their culture and 
reorganize their structures”). 
 2 See E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: A Pollution Control Program 
That Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1841 (1994). 
 3 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management 
Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1 (Cary 
Cognlianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
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environmental planning and internal policymaking.  To create an 
EMS, managers begin by establishing environmental goals and 
creating a specific plan to achieve those goals.  Managers and 
workers are assigned responsibilities for implementing parts of the 
plan, and they are trained in what they need to carry out these 
responsibilities.  They keep records that document their 
compliance with the plan and periodically the firm (or an outside 
auditor) reviews these records and assesses the firm’s performance 
in meeting its goals and following its internal procedures.  These 
periodic reviews are supposed to feed into revisions and 
continuous improvements in the firm’s overall system.  When 
auditing turns up deficiencies or problems, managers take remedial 
action and, as needed, amend their plan, returning to the start of 
what is commonly referred to as the “plan-do-check-act” cycle.4 
Trade associations and other non-governmental organizations 
have developed various standards or guidelines for EMSs.  The 
American Chemistry Council (ACC), the chemical industry’s most 
prominent trade association, requires its members to implement 
internal systems that accord with specific ACC environmental 
management principles.5  The most widely recognized EMS 
standards are found in “ISO 14001,” a series of certifiable 
principles established by the non-governmental International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO).6  ISO 14001 does not 
require firms to achieve any specific level of environmental 
performance, but rather calls on them to engage in “a holistic, 
strategic approach to the organization’s environmental policy, 
plans and actions.”7  Hundreds of thousands of companies around 
the world—and tens of thousands of firms in the U.S.—have 
voluntarily certified that their EMSs meet the ISO standards. 
Government officials share the business community’s interest 
in EMSs.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
concluded that “EMSs can help facilities achieve significantly 
 
 4 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving 
Environmental Management in the Private Sector, ENV’T, Nov. 2002, at 11. 
 5 Joseph Rees, Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical 
Industry, 19 LAW & POL’Y 477, 479–80 (1997). 
 6 See ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 25 (2006). 
 7 INT’L ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14000 ESSENTIALS, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials (last visited July 18, 2008). 
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improved environmental results” and the agency has decided to 
promote their “widespread use . . . to achieve improved 
environmental performance and compliance, pollution prevention 
through source reduction, and continual improvement.”8  For 
years, government prosecutors have included EMS requirements in 
consent decrees or given leniency to firms that have in place 
compliance-oriented EMSs.9  EPA and its counterparts in the states 
have established still more formal programs to encourage firms to 
develop EMSs, and in some cases government has even required 
outright that firms engage in specified management actions. 
The most prominent example of a program that encourages 
firms to adopt EMSs is the EPA’s National Environmental 
Performance Track.10  Established in 2000, Performance Track is a 
voluntary, facility level program designed to recognize and reward 
environmental facilities that the EPA considers to be 
environmental leaders.  According to Carol Browner, the EPA 
Administrator at the time of Performance Track’s creation, this 
program signaled “a new kind of environmental leadership that 
will make the 21st century an age of both continued environmental 
prosperity and environmental health.”11  The program works by 
having private sector facilities apply to become “members” of 
Performance Track.  As members, facilities receive special 
recognition from EPA as well as more tangible forms of benefits, 
such as a reduced inspection frequency and additional flexibility in 
meeting certain regulatory requirements. 
To qualify for membership in Performance Track, a facility 
 
 8 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POSITION STATEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (EMS) (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ems/docs/positionstatement-20051215.pdf. 
 9 See, e.g., Memoranda, John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance on the Use of Environmental 
Management Systems in Enforcement Settlements as Injunctive Relief  
and Supplemental Environmental Projects (June 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/incentives/ems/emssettlemen
tguidance.pdf (describing EMSs as a potentially valuable tool for promoting 
compliance with environmental standards). 
 10 See generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, EPA’s National 
Environmental Performance Track: What Is It Tracking?  What Role Is It 
Performing? (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal) (describing the 
Performance Track program and assessing how it attracts members). 
 11 Daniel Fiorino, Performance Track Places Trust in the Carrot over the 
Stick, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Spring 2001, at 9, 22 (quoting Administrator 
Browner). 
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must show EPA that it meets the following four criteria: (1) 
implement an independently audited EMS; (2) sustain a track 
record of compliance with environmental regulations; (3) make a 
commitment to achieve self-declared environmental goals that 
exceed what is currently required by existing regulations; and (4) 
demonstrate some engagement in community outreach concerning 
the environment.12  Prospective members can apply for 
membership during application periods held twice each year.  
Those facilities that are admitted must file annual reports, and 
every three years members must re-apply for membership.  Now in 
its eighth year of operation, Performance Track boasts over five 
hundred facilities as members.13 
In addition to EPA’s national Performance Track program, 
over the past decade about twenty states have developed similar 
programs that offer recognition and regulatory benefits to facilities 
that meet stated, management-related entry criteria.14  For 
example, the Commonwealth of Virginia has created an 
Environmental Excellence program that has three membership 
levels: E2, E3, and E4.15  Facilities that join at the E2 need to 
express interest in implementing an EMS, while E3 facilities must 
have implemented such a system and E4 facilities must have these 
systems certified by a third party and commit to meeting 
environmental and community outreach goals.  Over 250 facilities 
have become members at the E2 level, about 135 at the E3 level, 
and about a dozen at the E4 level.  Virginia has the largest state 
incentive program, but programs similar to Virginia’s can be found 
across the country, from Georgia to Idaho, Maine to New 
Mexico.16 
In other contexts, state and federal regulators have gone 
further and have actually mandated that companies implement 
management practices.  In mandating that firms engage in analysis 
and management practices, regulators leave it to the firms to select 
 
 12 Id. at 13. 
 13 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
TRACK, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). 
 14 Jonathan Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental 
Leadership Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of their Performance, 
ECOLOGY L. Q. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5, on file with journal). 
 15 Id. at 71. 
 16 Id. 
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concrete measures to address the risks they create.17  The most 
prominent federal example of such a management-based regulation 
is the “risk management planning” (RMP) rule under the Clean Air 
Act.18  The RMP rule requires firms that use high volumes of 
chemicals to implement a multi-step management practice to 
assess risks of chemical accidents, develop procedures designed to 
reduce those risks, and take actions to ensure that procedures are 
carried out in practice.  These firms must first conduct a hazard 
analysis to identify what could potentially go wrong in their 
facilities’ processes and what steps must be in place to prevent 
such accidents from occurring.  Firms must rank their different 
processes according to factors such as how many workers could 
potentially be affected or the operating history of the process, 
including any previous incidents involving the process.  They must 
next identify both actual and potential interventions to reduce 
hazards associated with each process, including control 
technologies, monitoring and early warning systems, training, and 
safety equipment.  Based on their analyses, firms must then 
develop written operating procedures both for normal operating 
conditions and emergency situations.  In addition, firms must 
continuously review these procedures and update them as 
necessary to reflect process changes, new technologies, or new 
knowledge.  By tracking process and incident data in a systematic 
way through RMP, firms are continuously supposed to seek ways 
to prevent environmental accidents.19 
Another prominent example of management-based regulation 
can be found in the regulations of over a dozen states that require 
high volume users of hazardous chemicals to engage in pollution 
prevention planning.20  Rather than mandating pollution control, 
state pollution prevention regulations require businesses to engage 
in a management process aimed at preventing pollution from 
occurring in the first place.  The Massachusetts Toxic Use 
 
 17 See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management Based Regulation: 
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 691, 694 (2003). 
 18 See Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, 40 C.F.R. § 68 (2007). 
 19 For further discussion of the RMP rule, see Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Risk 
Management Program Rule and Management-Based Regulation, in LEVERAGING 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 1, at 87–109. 
 20 See Lori S. Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A 
Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 
supra note 1, at 51–52. 
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Reduction Act (TURA)21 represents one such effort at 
management-based regulation designed to promote pollution 
prevention rather than just pollution control.  Under TURA, 
regulated firms must analyze the use and flow of toxic chemicals 
throughout their facilities, develop plans to reduce their use and 
emissions of toxics, and submit reports of their planning to state 
environmental agencies.  Massachusetts also requires that a state-
authorized “pollution prevention planner” certify each plan as 
having met the law’s criteria for what pollution prevention plans 
should contain.  Interestingly, although firms are required to go 
through the planning process and develop systems for reducing the 
use and emissions of toxic substances, TURA does not require 
firms to reduce toxics use or emissions, nor even to comply with 
their own plans.  The Act just imposes the managerial requirement: 
“plan.” 
II. MANAGEMENT MATTERS 
Management-based regulations and incentive programs are 
premised on the notion that a firm’s internal management critically 
shapes its impact on environmental quality.  This underlying 
assumption is gaining support in a growing body of academic 
research.  Recent ethnographic studies have shown that what goes 
on inside companies can make an important difference in shaping 
their environmental behavior and outcomes.22  A survey by 
Richard Florida and Derek Davison revealed that the companies 
adopting formal EMSs tended to be more cutting-edge firms that 
adopted innovative manufacturing processes more generally.23  Of 
course, the survey could not untangle the causal direction of the 
relationship; it seems likely that progressive management would 
lead firms to adopt EMSs more than the reverse. 
 
 21 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21I, §§ 1–23 (2002). 
 22 JENNIFER HOWARD-GRENVILLE, CORPORATE CULTURE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE: MAKING CHANGE AT A HIGH-TECHNOLOGY 
MANUFACTURER (2007); ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING THE FIRM: THE POLITICS 
OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000).  For a strategic account of how 
environmental management can pay off for firms, see FOREST L. REINHARDT, 
DOWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT (2000). 
 23 Richard Florida & Derek Davison, Why Do Firms Adopt Advanced 
Environmental Practices (and Do They Make a Difference)?, in REGULATING 
FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE 
POLICY GOALS? 88 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
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In a major study of environmental behavior in the pulp and 
paper industry, Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan, and Dorothy 
Thornton closely examined facilities operating in several countries 
and concluded that management styles played a key role in their 
varied environmental performance.24  Traditional external factors 
such as regulatory enforcement and economic conditions affected 
compliance with environmental law, but when it came to 
explaining why some pulp and paper mills went further and kept 
their pollution below permitted levels, the authors concluded that 
management mattered most.  They argued that management styles 
ranged from the “true believers”—firms that voluntarily invested 
in state-of-the-art equipment and proactively searched for ways to 
go beyond legal requirements—to the “environmental laggards”—
those that resisted even basic legal compliance.25 
Another recent study reinforced the importance of factors 
internal to organizations’ management in explaining their 
environmental behavior.26  Using a matched case study design of 
facilities across several sectors, Jennifer Howard-Grenville, 
Jennifer Nash, and I compared participants in a voluntary, 
management-based environmental program with similar facilities 
facing similar external pressures but that did not participate.  We 
found that facilities’ participation decisions corresponded with the 
kinds of organizational identities and managerial incentives that 
prevailed within their operations. 
A growing research literature on EMSs also generally 
supports the conclusion that management makes a difference.  
Numerous case studies showcase firms that have improved their 
environmental performance after implementing an EMS.  A 
broader study of S&P 500 companies suggests that EMS adoption 
typically precedes a reduction in toxic emissions when normalized 
 
 24 NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY THORNTON, SHADES 
OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2003); see also Neil 
Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and 
Environmental Protection: Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004). 
 25 GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN, supra note 24, at 99–102. 
 26 See generally Jennifer Howard-Grenville, Jennifer Nash & Cary 
Coglianese, Constructing the License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their 
Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 LAW & POL’Y 73 (2008) 
(providing interview-based evidence that internal factors such as managerial 
incentives, organizational culture, and organization identity can influence a 
firm’s decision to go beyond compliance with environmental regulations). 
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for production.27  The most rigorous analysis to date of ISO 14001 
adoption in the United States finds that firms that implement ISO-
certified EMSs show small, but statistically significant, 
improvements in measures of both environmental compliance and 
releases of toxic emissions.28 
III. CAN MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES WORK? 
If management plays a role in improving environmental 
quality, as the evidence indicates that it does, can government 
effectively induce firms to improve their environmental 
management (and thereby their environmental performance) 
through management-based incentives or regulations?  One might 
naturally predict such management-based strategies should work.  
But some healthy skepticism is warranted.  The actions firms 
voluntarily adopt are not necessarily a valid basis for inferring 
what they will do when encouraged or required by government.  
The firms that voluntarily adopt an EMS presumably have a 
different, and stronger, type of commitment to environmental 
protection than firms that do not volunteer.  Moreover, since by 
definition, management-based strategies encourage or require 
management practices—not necessarily improvements in 
environmental outcomes—it is possible that some firms will 
respond to government incentives or rules by gaming the 
regulators, that is, creating documents and procedures that look 
good on paper but do not reflect the (dirty) reality of actual, day-
to-day operations. 
These are not unreasonable concerns.  Nevertheless, 
management-based strategies might well lead some firms truly to 
improve their environmental performance.  Management-based 
strategies call upon firms to invest in the production of information 
about the environmental risks they create, about alternatives to 
reduce or mitigate those risks, and about procedures for continued 
monitoring and information collection.  The information generated 
through an EMS may ultimately prompt behavioral change either 
by (a) providing feedback directly to decision makers within firms 
about ways to reduce potential liabilities, or (b) giving information 
 
 27 Wilma Rose Q. Anton, George Deltas & Madhu Khanna, Incentives  
for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications for Environmental 
Performance, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 632, 652 (2004). 
 28 PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6, at 150. 
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to government officials and other interested parties, who in turn 
bring pressure to bear upon the firms’ decision makers. 
It has sometimes been argued that, even in the absence of 
regulation, socially responsible behavior yields bottom line results 
for businesses—what has come to be known as “win-win 
theory.”29  For example, Forest Reinhardt has shown that making 
investments in social goals can advance a company’s profits if 
doing so enables the company to lower production costs, 
differentiate its products from competitors, or manage liability 
risks better.30  Yet despite these reasons for businesses to act in 
socially responsible ways, a continued need for some form of 
governmental intervention indicates that firms generally do not 
find enough private benefits to act in ways that are privately costly 
but socially optimal.  As economists caution, if there was money 
simply lying on the floor in terms of profits from corporate 
responsibility, companies would have picked it up already.31 
These considerations about win-win theory help illuminate 
three complementary accounts of how management-based 
strategies might actually work to improve the environment.  The 
first explanation might be called a theory of “sunk search costs.”  
This account, like win-win theory, recognizes that firms can reap 
private rewards from investing in actions that deliver positive 
social outcomes.  But it also recognizes that firms face opportunity 
costs associated with identifying socially beneficial actions that 
also yield private actions.  In other words, to extend the 
economist’s analogy, firms do not find money simply lying on the 
floor waiting to be picked up by taking socially responsible action.  
Rather, such money lies hidden underneath the floor tiles and 
behind the shop equipment—if only managers can find it.  Since 
finding these cost savings and competitive advantages from 
socially responsible behavior is costly, rational firms will only 
expend the necessary search costs when the expected net benefits 
exceed the search costs.  Since firms have naturally not yet found 
 
 29 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Towards a New 
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Autumn 1995, at 97 (arguing that properly designed environmental regulation 
may lead to improved competitiveness). 
 30 See REINHARDT, supra note 22, at xii–xiii, 13–14. 
 31 See, e.g., Karen W. Palmer, Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 
Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost 
Paradigm, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1995, at 119 (arguing against the “false 
premise of cost-free controls”). 
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their unidentified cost savings, they may well view their expected 
net benefits of doing so as being quite small, discounted by a 
perceived low probability estimate of finding anything worthwhile.  
Firms’ managers would then conclude they are better off 
dedicating their time and resources elsewhere.32  For this reason, 
firms might be said to be rationally ignorant of potential win-win 
opportunities.  However, when management-based strategies either 
mandate or encourage firms to engage in planning and analysis, 
firms assume search costs that they otherwise would have avoided.  
Search costs at that point become sunk costs to the firm, and 
profit-enhancing actions the firm identifies along the way will be 
adopted as long as they prove to be net beneficial to the firm.33 
A second explanatory account focuses on the 
complementarity between planning and the achievement of social 
goals.34  Lori Bennear has shown that for management-based 
strategies to deliver social benefits, there must be a direct 
connection between the management activities required or 
encouraged and the desired social outcomes.  This 
complementarity is most readily apparent with problems that arise 
due to poor management.  Accidents in chemical plants, for 
example, could be expected to occur more frequently in facilities 
with poor oversight and coordination.  At the limit, entirely 
untrained workers who mix chemicals on their own accord, 
without supervision, would clearly be expected to be more likely 
to cause an accident.  Therefore, to the extent that there are 
management-based problems that generate environmental 
consequences, then management is clearly complementary and 
management-based strategies will make sense.  For these types of 
problems, strategies to encourage or require management would 
yield beneficial results if firms are not already engaging in a 
socially optimal level or quality of analysis, planning, and other 
complementary management activities.  The lack of good planning 
itself can be a type of market failure. 
Finally, mandatory management-based strategies 
(particularly, regulations) may prove effective due to the 
background threat of tort liability or other regulatory liability.  If 
 
 32 See Bennear, supra note 20, at 54–55. 
 33 This does not mean, of course, that a firm’s adoption of environmentally 
beneficial actions found after an investment of search costs in an EMS will 
necessarily be net beneficial to society. 
 34 See Bennear, supra note 20, at 55. 
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firms face a risk of liability when they discover problems but do 
nothing to solve them, then once they discover problems during a 
mandated management-based planning process, they have a pre-
existing background incentive to take action to solve them.  On 
this account, it is not solely the management-based regulation that 
operates to induce firms to make costly investments that follow 
from management-based regulation, but the interaction between 
management-based regulation and other legal norms.  However, 
under this account, incentives that merely encourage better 
environmental management will probably prove less effective, 
because many firms will probably not voluntarily engage in 
planning and management activities that could later expose them 
to legal liability. 
Ultimately, the question of whether management-based 
strategies are effective—and if so, what best explains their 
success—is an empirical one.  Getting empirical leverage on these 
matters, though, is not always easy.  When it comes to voluntary 
programs like Performance Track, government officials often tout 
the significant reported improvements achieved by participating 
facilities.35  But given the voluntary nature of these programs, we 
cannot easily know whether participants’ improvements would 
have occurred anyway.  Perhaps facilities that improve their 
performance for other reasons also seek out membership in 
management-based incentive programs in order to gain recognition 
and reward for progress they would be making anyway.  At 
present, the lack of available data on facilities before they 
participated in performance track programs, as well as on facilities 
not involved in these programs, inhibits the ability of researchers 
and government decision makers to discern whether incentive-
based environmental management programs actually work.36 
The available research of other kinds of voluntary programs 
might suggest that, at their best, programs like Performance Track 
will yield only modest results.  After reviewing the results of seven 
case studies of voluntary environmental programs in the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan, Richard Morgenstern and William Pizer found 
that “none of the case study authors found truly convincing 
 
 35 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE TRACK FIFTH 
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
perftrac/downloads/PTPRreport_05final.pdf (citing conservation numbers of 
Performance Track members). 
 36 See Borck et al., supra note 14. 
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evidence of dramatic environmental improvements.”37  Aseem 
Prakash and Matthew Potoski, in the best available study of the 
impact of voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 certification in the 
U.S., characterized these effects as rather “modest.”38  Once 
Prakash and Potoski had controlled for other factors, they found 
that ISO-certified “facilities spent on average one week less time 
out of compliance with government regulation.”39  In terms of 
toxic emissions, their results were “difficult to interpret” but 
nevertheless showed “not a very large improvement difference.”40  
On the assumption their data were normally distributed, Prakash 
and Potoski found that ISO-certified facilities ranked at most only 
3 percentiles better than non-certified facilities in terms of toxic 
releases. 
When it comes to management-based regulation, as opposed 
to voluntary management-based incentives, some data suggest that 
regulation can result in environmental gains.  Insurance claims in 
the chemical industry declined by 40% in the decade after the 
introduction of federal risk management planning requirements.41  
In the state of Massachusetts—the first state to adopt mandatory 
pollution prevention planning laws—the use of toxic chemicals 
declined by about 40% in the decade following the law’s adoption 
in 1989, with a decline of nearly 90% in the emissions of toxic 
chemicals.42  Of course, data such as these also need to be 
approached with caution.  Other factors unrelated to the 
introduction of management-based regulation can potentially 
explain at least some of the changes in reported outcomes, whether 
for the worse or for the better.  Pollution could decrease for 
reasons other than management-based regulation; it could also 
increase, even if management-based regulation worked 
successfully, if other factors overwhelmed any achieved 
improvements from improved management. 
 
 37 RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN & WILLIAM A. PIZER, REALITY CHECK: THE 
NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN 184 (2007). 
 38 PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6, at 166. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 17, at 724. 
 42 Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Act: Design and Implementation of a Management-Based 
Environmental Regulation (Harv. Univ. Reg. Pol’y Program Rep. No. RPP-07-
2004, 2004) (on file with journal). 
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Furthermore, the introduction of management-based 
regulation does not always occur in isolation of other regulatory 
changes.  Massachusetts’s reported declines in toxic emissions, for 
example, might have been affected by changes in conventional 
regulations, such as the contemporaneous performance-based 
hazardous air pollutant requirements in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.  After all, toxic emissions declined 46% across the 
entire United States during the same period.43  Moreover, 
compared with neighboring states in New England, where toxic 
emissions also declined an average of 87% during the same period, 
the 88% decline in toxic emissions in Massachusetts does not look 
nearly as striking.44  The declines reported during the same period 
in New Hampshire (93%), Connecticut (92%), and Rhode Island 
(91%) were somewhat larger than experienced in Massachusetts, 
even though none of these other states had adopted a management-
based pollution prevention law.45 
Statistical analysis needs to take account of potential 
confounding effects.  Lori Bennear has tested the effects of the 
pollution prevention planning laws using longitudinal data on toxic 
emissions from more than 30,000 facilities throughout the United 
States, both those located in the fourteen states that had adopted 
pollution prevention planning laws similar to TURA as well as 
facilities in other states.46  These laws only require that firms 
plan—not necessarily that they implement their plans.  Using a 
differences-in-differences statistical strategy, Bennear compared 
the trends in toxic emissions across both the “experimental” group 
of states with management-based regulation and the “control” 
group of states having no management-based regulation.  
Emissions declined everywhere, but to determine whether changes 
came about due to the introduction of management-based 
regulation, Bennear analyzed how the trends in management-based 
regulation states fared against other states when controlling for a 
variety of other factors correlated with toxic emissions.  She found 
that the presence of a management-based regulation in a facility’s 
state was associated with about a 30 percent decrease in toxic air 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Lori S. Bennear, Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? 
Evidence from State Pollution Prevention Programs, 26 J.  POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 327 (2007). 
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emissions—over and above what otherwise would have occurred 
in the absence of the management-based law.47  Bennear’s study is 
the strongest evidence to date that management-based laws like 
TURA can help reduce pollution. 
That said, it is one thing for a management-based regulation 
to achieve improvements in the near term, shortly following its 
introduction.  It is another for regulation to sustain long term and 
continual improvements over time.  Can management-based 
regulation continue to spur firms to make improvements in the 
long term?  Interestingly, the statistically significant effects in the 
Bennear study (at the 5 percent level) occurred within two to four 
years after the imposition of a planning mandate.  The statistical 
significance dropped for years five and six (10 percent level).  
After six years, mandatory planning requirements showed no 
statistically significant effect on toxic emissions.48  These declines 
in statistical significance may be an artifact of the data, resulting 
from a small sample size due to the fact that there the states with 
oldest management-based regulations are also the least in number.  
But it is not inconceivable that the returns from management-based 
regulation diminish over time.  According to interviews with 
facility managers subject to Massachusetts’s Toxic Use Reduction 
Act, facilities achieved most of their gains in the first few years 
after TURA’s planning requirement took effect.  Managers 
reported that with the passage of time they found fewer 
opportunities (or fewer low-cost opportunities) to make further 
improvements.  After the so-called low-hanging fruit gets picked, 
some managers treat mandatory pollution prevention planning as 
little more than a paperwork exercise.49 
IV. THE ROLE FOR MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES 
There is surely no single way to fix all that ails the 
environmental protection system in the United States.  
Management-based strategies likewise are no cure-all.  But the 
managerial turn in environmental policy appears to have taken 
hold and will not likely disappear any time soon.  Management-
based strategies find support in a compelling logic that ultimately 
the private sector’s compliance with environmental law and its 
 
 47 Id. at 340. 
 48 Id. at 341–42. 
 49 See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 42. 
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actual progress in protecting the environment will be a function of 
choices made by companies’ managers.  Furthermore, as society’s 
environmental problems grow more complex, and conventional 
solutions appear less tractable, management-based strategies’ 
adaptability and flexibility only serve to increase their 
attractiveness as cost-effective alternatives to traditional forms of 
regulation. 
Management-based strategies might be also thought of as a 
first line of defense in addressing new environmental risks.  
According to self-reported responses to one recent survey, the use 
of management systems correlates with reported improvements in 
unregulated aspects of business—such as avoiding spills or 
conserving energy—but not with reported improvements in 
regulated aspects, such as air and water emissions.50  The most 
promising role for management strategies, then, could be to push 
environmental progress on fronts not being addressed by existing 
regulation.  This has long been a stated goal of EPA’s Performance 
Track, with its emphasis on EMSs.  However, the major question 
remains whether management-based strategies can truly offer 
significantly improved environmental outcomes—or whether they 
will just lull the public into thinking something is being done to 
address new environmental problems. 
Unfortunately, measuring the effectiveness of management-
based strategies on unregulated environmental problems may 
prove to be a most difficult undertaking, for the same reasons that 
it is difficult to evaluate any voluntary program.  Unregulated 
environmental problems are usually problems for which firm-
specific data are not required to be reported, so even in programs 
that require volunteers to report on their unregulated aspects, there 
will be a lack of comparable data before the volunteers joined the 
program or comparable data on firms that do not participate. 
In the absence of good evaluation research, it will be difficult 
to learn whether some types of management-based strategies might 
work better if designed or implemented differently.  In terms of 
their design, present-day management-based strategies promote a 
form of management that is highly systematic and rigorous, a form 
 
 50 Richard N. L. Andrews, Andrew M. Hutson & Daniel Edwards, Jr., 
Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do Mandates Affect 
Performance?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 1, at 111. 
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of internal engineering.51  But clear, analytic planning and precise 
forms of bureaucratic ordering are surely not the only—and maybe 
not the most important—features of good management.  Dramatic 
changes in environmental performance may call for more creative, 
less rigid, more holistic management that fosters outside-the-box 
thinking.  It is entirely possible that the best management 
practices—whether for environmental protection or economic 
success—require a much greater degree of decentralization and 
internal competition within organizations than is reflected in the 
current EMS ethos.  More likely still, a firm’s leadership may be 
what really makes the difference—and yet it is hard to imagine 
how public policy could define, let alone foster, the characteristics 
of the real leadership needed for firms to make and sustain 
environmental change. 
Implementing management-based strategies effectively also 
calls for adequate oversight.  Yet the very challenges that make 
management-based strategies attractive—namely, complexity in 
environmental problems and heterogeneity in their sources—also 
present challenges in overseeing the management government 
encourages or requires.  Can government even know what truly 
constitutes “good” management?  The most knowledgeable and 
sophisticated government officials still will undoubtedly have less 
information than private sector managers about how to manage 
their individual operations to return a profit and reduce 
environmental impacts.  A critical question, then, is how regulators 
can overcome their informational disadvantage to ensure that firms 
subjected to management-based incentives or regulation are 
planning effectively and implementing those plans.  Instead of 
conducting performance tests or observing whether firms have 
installed proper equipment, inspectors under management-based 
regulation need to assess the adequacy of a firm’s planning and the 
documentation of its implementation.  This can amount to a 
considerable new burden on certain regulatory agencies, which 
may need additional resources to meet the challenges. 
 
 51 See THEO DE BRUIJN & VICKI NORBERG-BOHM, VOLUNTARY, 
COLLABORATIVE, AND INFORMATION-BASED POLICIES: LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
(2001) (noting that “[t]he current approaches to EMS are overly bureaucratic” 
and calling for efforts “to reduce transaction costs by focusing on information 
generation that is useful to the firm and streamlining reporting requirements”) 
(on file with journal). 
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Given the challenges associated with a heavy reliance on 
management-based strategies, the most appropriate role for them 
in the near term would appear to be to augment conventional forms 
of environmental regulation.  One way of doing so is to promote 
management systems that assist firms in maintaining regulatory 
compliance.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that management 
systems do enhance firms’ compliance, and more systematic 
empirical research indicates that ISO-certified EMSs are 
associated with at least modest compliance improvements.52  Yet, 
so far the research does not indicate whether the compliance 
improvements associated with EMSs come in the form of 
procedural compliance (such as in filing timely reports) or in 
substantive compliance (such as in reducing harmful emissions).  
Although all compliance might well be socially desirable, if all 
EMSs do is help facilities handle their paperwork burdens better, 
this certainly weakens the case for management-based strategies. 
Environmental groups are already not enthusiastic supporters 
of management-based programs like Performance Track.  Even the 
business community, which presumably should favor initiatives 
that leave it discretion to find less costly means of addressing 
environmental problems, actually exhibits ambivalence toward 
management-based strategies.  Many businesses have on their own 
adopted ISO-certified EMSs; several major trade associations have 
implemented their own management-based solutions (such as 
Responsible Care); and about five hundred facilities have now 
secured membership in EPA’s Performance Track program.53  But 
far more firms and industries have yet to take any interest in 
developing ISO-certified EMSs or joining programs like 
Performance Track.  Industry has also outright resisted a number 
of efforts to impose management-based regulation and related 
information-based requirements.  The Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Act came into existence only after industry capitulated 
in the face of a credible threat of a citizen’s initiative that would 
have banned the use of toxic chemicals altogether.  Subsequent 
 
 52 See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6.  It should be noted, however, that 
Prakash and Potoski’s measure included compliance with the procedural 
requirements as well as with substantive environmental performance limits, 
without an ability to untangle whether ISO-certification was associated with 
improvements in one or the other. 
 53 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE TRACK, supra note 13. 
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attempts to expand TURA’s requirements have met with resistance 
from industry, as have efforts in Congress to adopt a national 
pollution prevention planning law.54  The federal Toxic Release 
Inventory, which simply requires the collection and reporting of 
information, has itself generated pitched battles, as have recent 
federal legislative efforts to impose security-related planning 
requirements on chemical facilities. 
Management-based strategies offer little escape from the 
contentious politics and policy gridlock that most would agree 
characterized environmental policymaking at the end of the 
twentieth century.  On the contrary, dramatic expansion of 
management-based strategies could well exacerbate ideological 
line drawing.  Attempts to influence or control management 
processes begin to intrude into the core of private sector decision 
making.  What could be more central to a free enterprise system 
than the ability of private managers to decide how to run their own 
operations? 
Some business leaders and politicians might also worry about 
the extent to which management-based strategies give government 
officials worrisome discretion.  If effective management cannot be 
easily observed and inter-subjectively validated, the risk of 
arbitrary government decision making presumably increases.  
Some private sector firms may be rewarded simply because they 
look like they have adopted sound management practices, while 
other firms that are really making a difference in reducing 
pollution could go unrewarded or even punished if they lack the 
kind of practices that the government deems necessary or 
desirable. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the potential political perils inherent in the current 
managerial turn in environmental policymaking, management-
based strategies are likely to remain attractive and plausible 
options to consider in charting a course for environmental policy in 
the next administration and beyond.  Of course, in deciding 
whether and when to rely on management-based strategies, policy 
 
 54 Coglianese & Nash, supra note 42, at 88–95; STEPHEN M. JOHNSON, 
ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 355 (2001); Robert Style, Are 
State Laws Motivating Business to Pursue Pollution Prevention?, POLLUTION 
PREVENTION, Winter 1993/94, at 61. 
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makers should undertake the same kind of regulatory analysis that 
they should use in evaluating any other option.  Businesses may 
well resist the costs or intrusiveness of the planning associated 
with management-based regulations, but these planning and 
paperwork requirements are justified anyway if the private sector 
undersupplies effective risk management practices from the 
standpoint of overall social welfare.  When management-based 
strategies can be shown to work better than their alternatives, they 
should certainly be used. 
Additional empirical evaluation is needed to understand better 
precisely when and how to use management-based strategies.  
There remains a need for further empirical research on the impacts 
of management-based strategies, especially to learn whether they 
can achieve meaningful benefits for society over the long term.  
Even though existing research shows that management-based 
regulation can prove successful under certain circumstances, the 
question remains whether such positive effects can be sustained 
over time—or whether any positive effects of management-based 
regulation diminish after the low-hanging fruit has been picked. 
Given what we know now, it would be folly to think that, by 
themselves, management-based strategies could lead the way to a 
fundamentally transformed system of environmental protection.55  
Yet even if they cannot catalyze a revolution in environmental 
protection, management-based strategies have shown themselves 
to be a promising instrument in the policy toolkit. 
The challenge for Congress and the regulatory agencies in the 
future will remain one of searching for the best tools for specific 
environmental problems and challenges.  In some cases, the best 
available alternative will take the form of the conventional 
environmental regulation that has been used for the last forty 
years.  In other cases, it will be best to use market-based 
instruments that have now been tried for specific environmental 
problems like phasing out lead from gasoline or addressing sulfur 
dioxide air pollution.  However, in still other cases management-
 
 55 On occasion, some EPA officials appear to claim that they could.  See, 
e.g., Daniel Fiorino, supra note 11, at 9 (“A sea change in environmental 
management is underway that may well be the wave of the future.”); U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE TRACK FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra 
note 35, at 31 (“Performance Track and its state counterparts aim to transform 
the way that government and industry address environmental issues and solve 
problems.”). 
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based strategies will be appropriate and useful.  Some 
environmental problems, for example, stem from the operations of 
a highly diverse set of industrial actors, where there is no clear 
one-size-fits-all technological solution and where it is difficult for 
regulators to monitor performance as necessary to enforce 
emissions limits, taxes, or trading.56  In cases like these, and 
perhaps others as well, legislators and regulators will likely find 
the best option is to continue to make the managerial turn. 
 
 
 56 See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 17. 
